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Abstract:  
This paper focuses on the impact of property rights insecurity on deforestation in the 
Brazilian Legal Amazon. Deforestation is considered as a risk management strategy: property 
rights insecurity reduces the present value of forests and fosters forest conversion into 
agricultural and pasture lands. Moreover, deforestation is the consequence of strategic 
interactions between landowners and squatters. Landowners clear the forest preventively in 
order to assert the productive use of land and to reduce the expropriation risk. Squatters 
invade land plots, clear the forest and may afterwards gain official recognition with formal 
property titles. A particular attention is paid to the measure of land property rights insecurity 
in the Brazilian context. It is assumed that property rights insecurity has a multidimensional 
character taken into account by the number of homicides related to land conflicts and 
expropriation procedures. Principal component analysis allows synthesising such information. 
An econometric model of deforestation is estimated on a panel dataset on the 1988-2000 
period and the nine states of the Brazilian Legal Amazon. The hypothesis that insecure land 
property rights contribute to higher rates of deforestation is not rejected when the simultaneity 
bias between insecure property rights and deforestation is addressed. This result questions the 
modality of the Brazilian land reform that considers forested areas as unproductive and thus 
open for expropriation procedures.  
Keywords 
Deforestation, insecure property rights, Brazilian Legal Amazon 
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1 Introduction 
According to the Brazilian National Institute of Space Research (INPE – Instituto Nacional 
de Pesquisas Espaciais) by August 2007, the deforested area in the Brazilian Legal Amazon 
(BLA) reached 700 thousand square km, which represent 14% of its geographic area.1 Most 
of the deforestation, 570 thousand square km to be more precise, took place in the last three 
decades since 1977. During the 1988-2007 period the annual rate of deforestation (figure 1) 
fluctuates between 11000 square km in 1991 (0.2 % of the BLA geographic area) and 29000 
square km in 1995 (0.6%) with an average value of 18000 square km (0.4%).  
The deforestation process in tropical zones is highly complex and has been the subject of 
many theoretical and empirical studies mobilizing both social and natural sciences (e.g. 
Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2000; Pfaff, 1999; van Kooten and Folmer, 2004, chapter 13). 
According to Geist and Lambin (2002), sources or proximate causes of deforestation relate 
mainly to investments in infrastructure and road networks (e.g. Andersen et al., 2002) and to 
economic activities such as cattle ranching (Kaimowitz, 1996; Caviglia-Harris, 2005), 
agricultural activities (Barbier, 2004) and commercial logging as well (Otsuki et al., 2002; 
van Kooten and Folmer, 2004). In the Brazilian Amazon, these activities supported by 
government policies through credit and tax policy, played intermingled roles in the process of 
deforestation (Binswanger, 1991; Margulis, 2003; Mertens et al., 2002; Walker et al., 2000). 
Geo-ecological factors such as soil quality, rainfall and temperature conditions (Chomitz and 
Thomas, 2003) are considered as predisposing factors of deforestation which condition the 
links between proximate and underlying causes. The latter operate mainly at the macro level 
and are related to social processes and economic policies such as population pressure 
                                                 
1
 Legal Amazon is a 5 millions square km administrative area defined for regional planning purposes 
comprehending 4 millions square km of tropical forests as well as the savanna (cerradão) and transitional 
vegetation in the southeast areas of the region. 
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(Cropper and Griffiths, 1994), landownership and income distributions, national and regional 
development strategies (Koop and Tole, 2001), agricultural research and technological change 
as well (Southgate et al., 1990).  
Particular attention has been paid to the environmental Kuznets curve for deforestation in 
econometric studies based upon international datasets (e.g. Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004; 
Culas, 2007; Cropper and Griffiths, 1994). Other studies have highlighted the role played by 
macroeconomic - fiscal, exchange rate and / or sectoral policies - in the deforestation process 
(e.g. Anderson, 1990; Arcand et al., 2007). In studies dedicated to tropical deforestation, 
institutional factors have received special attention. Forest is considered as a natural capital 
that will generate future streams of output and income (Angelsen, 2007; Solow, 1992). 
Incentives to accumulate long term assets including natural ones thus depend on the quality of 
legal institutions and more specifically on the enforcement of rules that protect property 
rights. The poor quality of institutions enforcing property rights in developing countries - De 
Soto (2000) claims that western property law transplanted from colonial countries does not fit 
the context of developing countries - may thus constitute a major impediment to investment in 
forest conservation. 
Numerous empirical studies point out that the weakness of institutions in developing 
countries favours forest and other natural resources depletion. Deacon (1999) and 
Mendelsohn (1994), working on a cross-country dataset, evidence a detrimental effect of 
insecure ownership on deforestation. In both studies, property rights insecurity arises from the 
lack of government accountability and the political instability as measured by the type of 
government, constitutional changes, revolutions, political assassinations, purges, as well as 
guerrilla warfare. Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) highlight also the positive effects of an 
improvement in political institutions and governance for forest preservation while measuring 
institutional quality with indices of political rights and civil liberty. Culas (2007) uses the 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.20 
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Knack and Keefer’s (1995) indicators of contract enforceability and bureaucracy efficiency to 
demonstrate the positive impact of institutional arrangements for secure property rights on 
forest preservation.  
Econometric studies of the impact of ownership risk on deforestation have also been 
carried out on South and Central American countries but the results are far from conclusive. 
Godoy et al. (1998), working on a panel of eighteen Bolivian villages in the rainforest, show 
that conflicts between cattle ranchers, loggers and smallholders boost deforestation. Otsuki et 
al. (2002), using a municipal panel dataset on the Brazilian Amazon, conclude that holding a 
land title improves the technical efficiency and thus reduces deforestation. Nelson et al. 
(2001) indicate that removing property rights in indigenous reserves is likely to foster 
deforestation in Panama. However Deininger and Minten (2002) working on two poor 
Mexican states, show that property rights do not have any impact on deforestation once 
physiogeographic factors and population density are controlled for. Wood and Walker (2001) 
find ambiguous results when they compare the behaviour of titled and untitled small farmers 
in the Brazilian Amazon: possession of title discourages exploitation of timber and promotes 
reforestation but encourages expansion of cultivated areas to the detriment of forest.  
This paper focuses on the consequences of ownership insecurity on deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon proposing an original measure of property rights insecurity. The Brazilian 
legal system does not provide a complete bundle of rights to land as defined by the property 
rights paradigm (Alchian, 1965; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973).2 As a consequence, insecure 
land property rights prevail resulting in violent land conflicts and expropriation procedures. 
These variables - land conflicts and expropriation processes - are used to measure land 
property rights insecurity in the econometric analysis. The rest of the paper proceeds as 
                                                 
2
 A property right is said complete when three elements are warranted by the legal system: (i) exclusivity of 
rights of use of a resource (usus); (ii) exclusivity of rights to the services provided by a resource (fructus) and 
(iii) right to transfer a resource (abusus) (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974; Libecap, 1999). 
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follows. Section two discusses the links between property rights insecurity and deforestation. 
Section three presents the econometric model and the panel dataset, which includes annual 
observations from 1988 to 2000 on the nine states of the Brazilian Legal Amazon. Section 
four concludes. 
2 The effects of insecure land property rights on 
deforestation 
According to de Soto (2000), economic history offers striking examples of how squatters 
have organized themselves through individual and collective actions to get informal or 
extralegal ownership and legitimate land occupations. The North American experience in the 
19th century illustrates how laws have evolved to grant the recognition of squatters’ rights on 
land settlements and thus allowing them to be incorporated into the market economy. In 
developing countries however, the historical trajectory was quite different. In most of them a 
large part of the land settled is not legally owned. The legal requirements to get a formal title 
are often onerous and the legal system does not protect landholders against expropriation 
from government and eviction from other individuals.3 
The Brazilian legal framework illustrates this kind of institutional failures since it does not 
provide adequate protection to landholders’ rights: a large number of landholders do not have 
legal titles and enforcing property rights is costly especially in remote areas. Moreover, title 
holders face a risk of loosing their rights to the land as a result of land reform policies (section 
2.1). In such a risky environment, deforestation becomes a rational choice. As part of a risk 
management strategy, agents convert forests into pasture or agricultural lands (section 2.2). At 
the same time, deforestation can also be analysed as the result of strategic interactions 
between landowners and squatters who compete for land access and attempt to legitimate 
                                                 
3
 See for example the case of Peru in de Soto (2000). 
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their ownership (section 2.3). In both cases, insecure property rights are expected to favour 
forest clearing.  
2.1 The weaknesses of the institutional framework for secure 
property rights in the Brazilian Amazon 
2.1.1 Numerous landholders do not have legal titles 
The vast majority of small and large farmers’ settlements in the Amazon occurred 
spontaneously outside the official colonization areas, taking place on public lands or unused 
private lands along the Belém-Brasilia, Cuiabá-Porto Velho and Cuiaba-Santarém axial roads. 
Large scale government settlements in the Brazilian Amazon started in the early seventies 
with the federal programs of colonization associated with the construction of the 
Transamazonic highway. Though there were occasional sales of large plots of public lands, 
most of the colonization programs took place by sales of smaller plots to colonists within 
official projects managed by the INCRA.4 These opportunities of legal access to public lands 
were practically halted by the end of the eighties (Fearnside, 2001).  
A large part of the territory of the Brazilian Amazon, however, remained under public 
domain, lacking any kind of government titling and thereby open for private claiming. On top 
of that, the Brazilian legal framework provides a strong stimulus for moving from informal 
land occupation to full property rights (Cleary, 1993). According to the Statute of the Land of 
1964, later incorporated in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution as the legal basis of land reform, 
squatters have the right to settle on undeveloped public lands and to make private use of them. 
If they exploit land for at least one year, they can receive a right of usufruct and, after five 
years of continuing occupation and development they are able to get full property rights. The 
Constitution also recognizes the squatters’ right to claim for private land that is not in 
                                                 
4
 INCRA (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária) is the National Institute for Colonization and Land 
Reform, a federal agency created in 1971.  
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productive use. If squatters exploit private lands during five consecutive years without legal 
opposition from landowners, they are able to obtain formal property titles.5  
INCRA is the government agency responsible for the supervision and distribution of land 
titles in public lands. Its prerogatives also include the expropriation of unproductive land from 
private landowners to be redistributed among squatters. The titling process however tends to 
be costly and long, requiring two to five years for completion. Furthermore, budget 
constraints limit the actions of INCRA, as well as its ability to process title applications 
(Alston et al., 1996).  
As a consequence a large fraction of landholdings are not legally registered or remain 
untitled. Agricultural Censuses show that at least 50% of landholdings in the Legal Amazon 
during the seventies were exploited by squatters or farmers without a legal title of land 
property (posseiros). During the following decades, the share of posseiros decreased but, up to 
1995 they still represented about 30% of landholdings according to the last published 
Agricultural Census (Araujo et al., 2006). This large fraction of illegal agricultural 
establishments results from the complexity and inefficiency of the system of land registration 
which tends to foster land grabbing (grilagem da terra). Land grabbers (grileiros) constitute 
large illegal holdings resorting to the falsification of documents, corruption of INCRA’s 
agents or notaries (cartorios), threats and violence against small landowners. Their activities 
are often financed by large scale logging and landowning companies (Fearnside, 2001; 
Margulis, 2003). 
Farmers who do not have legal land titles cannot successfully prosecute to enforce their 
rights. Furthermore, in case of land disputes, their claims are hardly considered by courts. 
Legal titles are difficult to enforce as well since the presence of judiciary institutions is 
                                                 
5
 If landowners evict squatters, the latter can obtain compensation on behalf of the owners for all improvements 
made to the land (Alston et al., 2000). 
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scanty. It is often the case that property rights are secured through occupation of the land, 
resorting to violence (Margulis, 2003). 
2.1.2 Land titles do not provide protection against encroachment or expropriation 
Though, in principle, land title possession should give the holder the right for legal 
enforcement of his property right, the Brazilian Constitution allows invasion of private lands 
that are not used for productive purposes. This concept is not clearly defined, but the 
Constitution authorises the reassignment of private lands to squatters if the land is not placed 
into productive use. In practice, forestlands are considered as unproductive areas (e.g. 
Margulis, 2003). Consequently, forested lands in Amazon are more vulnerable to invasions by 
squatters and redistribution by the INCRA, than pasture and agricultural lands (Alston et al., 
2000; Fearnside, 2001).  
Since the end of the eighties, land redistribution actions consisted mainly of ex-post 
regularization of landholdings which are the outcome of invasions of private lands (Alston et 
al., 2000; Fearnside, 2001). Squatters’ organizations such as the Landless Peasant Movement 
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra)6 developed strategies for selecting and 
invading farms and then obtaining expropriation by the INCRA. In order to draw the attention 
of the INCRA, squatters are prompted to engage in conflict with landowners who try to evict 
them by all means including violence. Landowners can also appeal to courts to obtain the 
recognition of their rights and recover their plots, but the INCRA can expropriate farms even 
if courts have ordered eviction of squatters. 
The phenomenon of land invasions by squatters led to the so called industry of invasion. 
Migrants receive land from the INCRA, sell it through informal arrangements and manage to 
                                                 
6
 This movement is rooted in the civil society and was structured in the 1980s by the Catholic Pastoral Land 
Commission in order to promote land reform. 
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get land through another INCRA settlement (Fearnside, 2001). This industry is favoured by 
the lack of a national registry of settlements. 
2.2 Deforestation as a risk management strategy 
As emphasized by the property rights paradigm, any legal or extralegal system shapes 
economic incentives and risks which condition agents’ behaviours. When property rights are 
insecure, agents face a risk of expropriation or eviction and may lose their lands and capital, 
including natural assets. As a consequence, they try to reduce their risk exposure by choosing 
activities that generate immediate returns. This choice is usually detrimental to forest stocks 
which require long periods to accumulate. 
Farmers choose between alternative land uses – forest exploitation, cattle ranching or 
agriculture - comparing their relative risk adjusted profitabilities. Forest is a natural asset 
which generates inter-temporal flows of incomes that arise from timber (wood, fuel wood, 
etc.) and in a smaller amount from non-timber forest products (fruits, oils, medicinal plants, 
latex, ecological services, etc.)7. A sustainable forest management consists in harvesting a 
given amount of wood every t years or in a sustainable exploitation of non timber products 
that generates annual returns.8 The risk of losing property rights in land affects landowners’ 
choices. It increases the discount rate in present value calculations and depreciates future 
incomes from land. Mendelsohn (1994) shows that the value of sustainable forest uses, falls 
more rapidly than the value of forest mining activities. Agents who face a risk of confiscation 
favour clear-cutting, agricultural land conversion and cattle ranching that yield immediate 
                                                 
7
 The 1995 – 96 census data show that extraction of non-timber forest products generated approximately 25% of 
the total value of forest extraction activities (Andersen et al. 2002, p. 107). 
8
 Defining and identifying a sustainable forest management is a complex question. According to the 
conservationist point of view any exploitation of primary forests is non sustainable. A less stringent approach 
allows selective clearings which do not definitely compromise the fundamental functions of forest ecosystems. 
For instance, ITTO (2005) defines criterions for a sustainable management of forests.  
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profits. Moreover, the mobility of livestock makes it easier to protect than fixed assets such as 
standing forests in case of confiscation episodes. 
Put differently, ownership insecurity promotes activities and production technologies that 
are less capital intensive (Deacon, 1994). Land users are incited to substitute less capital 
intensive activities such as traditional agriculture and cattle ranching, to a sustainable forest 
management that is natural capital intensive and has a longer production process. 
Deforestation is then a kind of disinvestment that reduces exposure to eviction risk. 
Moreover, Bohn and Deacon (2000) establish that the effect of ownership risk depends 
critically on the capital intensity of resource extraction technologies. If the latter are capital 
intensive (e.g. oil extraction), eviction risk favours resource conservation; it is not the case of 
wood extraction in the Brazilian Amazon.  
2.3 Deforestation as the result of strategic interactions 
In order to strengthen their rights, landowners have an incentive to clear the forest thus 
proving their productive use of land. Clearing forest also signals the landowners’ willingness 
to keep squatters away (Libecap, 1999). Landowners will react more firmly when cultivated 
or pasture plots are threatened by invasions. Moreover, deforestation may help to enforce 
property rights: it may be easier and less costly to protect property rights on cultivated areas 
than on forest lands. Farm boundaries may be purposely marked with trees, irrigation systems, 
etc. that are easier to monitor or that help detect intrusions.  
In this situation where property rights are insecure, forestlands can be considered as open 
access resources and deforestation as ownership establishment strategies. These strategies can 
be compared to those of the colonists in the 18th and 19th centuries in the United States who 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.20 
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gained extralegal land titles resorting to the so-called tomahawk right.9 These extralegal titles 
have been legalized years later by occupancy laws and pre-emption (De Soto, 2000).  
Angelsen (2001) establishes that strategic interactions between landowners and squatters 
who compete for open access forestlands result in excess deforestation, i.e. higher than it 
would be with secure property rights. Strategic behaviours may explain why farmers clear the 
forest even though net profit might be negative in the first years. Farmers anticipating positive 
future returns after the expansion of roads or the adoption of technological change, clear the 
forest now in order to prevent others from claiming the land. Alston et al. (2001) also model 
interactions between squatters and landowners leading to violent conflicts. In this framework, 
landowners clear the forest to prevent squatters’ settlements and squatters clear the forest to 
gain formal property rights. Conflicts arise from invasions by squatters and efforts to evict by 
owners. Expropriations by the INCRA generate incentives for squatters’ encroachments and 
violent conflicts with landowners.  
3 The econometric model 
The discussion above has underscored positive effects of insecure property rights on 
deforestation. An econometric approach relying on a model of deforestation is now developed 
to formally test this hypothesis. The model includes usual economic determinants of 
deforestation (control variables) and a measure of land property rights insecurity which 
constitutes the test variable. Dataset heterogeneity and a potential endogeneity bias of the 
insecure property rights measure are taken into account through adequate econometric 
modelling. The econometric specification and dataset description are followed by the 
discussion of econometric results. 
                                                 
9
 The tomahawk right is implemented by marking trees, planting trees near springs etc. 
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3.1 Model specification and data 
We test the impact of property rights insecurity on deforestation with the following 
equation: 
ti
K
k
k
ti
k
tititi Xinsecurityiondeforestat ,
1
,,,
ε+γ+β+α+α= ∑
=
  
Where subscripts i denote the nine states which encompass the Brazilian Legal Amazon,10 
and subscripts t denote the 13 years between 1988 and 2000.11 The dependent variable, 
(deforestation), is the annual rate of deforestation in square km; insecurity proxies for 
property rights insecurity; Xk is a control variable; k = 1,…, K;  α, β, γk are unknown 
parameters to be estimated. The fixed state effect is a specific constant term αi catching 
unobserved time invariant state heterogeneity due to differences in their geographical and 
environmental characteristics; the time or period fixed effect αt catches unobserved annual 
heterogeneity generated by federal policies and international environment modifications that 
may impact deforestation; εi,t is the disturbance term independently and normally distributed. 
3.1.1 Deforestation  
INPE provides annual deforestation data for each state of the Legal Amazon since 1988 
(Figure 1). Deforestation measures are based upon Landsat satellite images interpreted by 
project PRODES (Monitoramento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite). 
Deforestation is a gross measure since interpretation of satellite image counts as permanently 
deforested any geographic area that was cleared once. Secondary forests are thus counted as 
deforested areas (Andersen et al., 2002).  
[Insert Figure 1] Annual deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon 
                                                 
10
 The states are the following: Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará, Amapá, Tocantins, Mato Grosso and 
part of Maranhão. 
11
 The sample size is limited by the availability of data on property rights insecurity. 
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The geographic distribution of deforestation among the Legal Amazon states is unequal. 
From 1988 to 2007, deforestation is concentrated in the so-called arc of deforestation i.e. the 
northern areas of the state of Mato Grosso and the southern areas of Pará and Rondônia. 
These three states are respectively responsible for 36%, 32 % and 14% of total deforestation 
in the Legal Amazon. As a percentage of geographic area, cumulative deforestation for the 
1988-2007 period represents 21%, 14% and 9% respectively of the states of Rondônia, Mato 
Grosso and Para. 
Time trends in deforestation are similar within the nine BLA states. Two major peaks took 
place in 1995 and 2004. Apart from the high growth record of the Brazilian economy, no 
specific reasons have been identified to explain the large jump in deforestation in 1995 
(Andersen et al., 2002). The recorded high levels of deforestation in 2004 however, are 
clearly related to the booming agricultural prospects brought by the coupling of continuous 
exchange rate depreciation and improvement of international prices of agricultural 
commodities, soybean in particular. 
3.1.2 Property rights insecurity 
Property rights insecurity has a multidimensional character and is measured crossing 
different indicators. It is assumed that proxies for insecure property rights are the number of 
homicides related to land conflicts (homicides)12 measured by the Catholic Pastoral 
Commission13 and expropriations initiatives undertaken by the INCRA. The latter are 
measured by expropriated areas (expropriated areas) and the number of families settled in 
agrarian reform projects (expropriation number).14  
                                                 
12
 The number of homicides related to land conflicts can be compared to overall homicides rates provided by the 
IPEA. These two measures are positively and significantly correlated. The former is preferred since the latter 
encompasses urban violence which is not directly related to land property rights insecurity. 
13
 They are reported by the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST). 
14
 Descriptive statistics on the sample are reported in Table 6 in the appendix. 
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First we check the positive correlation between these three indicators coming from two 
independent sources (Table 1). Second, a principal component analysis is conducted in order 
to derive an aggregate measure of insecure property rights as a weighted sum of the three 
indicators.  The resulting insecurity variable is the first principal component calculated as a 
linear combination of the homicides, expropriated areas and expropriation number variables; 
their weights are given by the first eigenvector (Table 7 in the appendix). This procedure 
reduces the dimension of the insecurity variable while minimising the loss of information. It 
then saves instruments15 in the econometric estimation. 
[Insert Table 1] Correlation matrix of insecurity indicators 
The insecurity values computed annually for each state should be exclusively read as 
relative indices of property rights insecurity.16 The states of Parà, Maranhão and Mato Grosso 
exhibit insecurity indices that are higher than the median value of the pooled sample of states 
in the 1988-2000 period (Table 2).17 It is striking that these three states together with 
Rondônia also show annual deforestation rates higher than the median value of the sample; 
this correlation holds when deforestation rate is calculated as a percentage of geographic area. 
Data also highlight a spectacular jump in ownership insecurity in 1995/1996 echoed in 
deforestation data (Table 3). These findings suggest a potential relationship between property 
rights insecurity and deforestation that requires more rigorous econometric tests to be 
confirmed. 
[Insert Table 2] State level of property rights insecurity and deforestation 
[Insert Table 3] Annual level of property rights insecurity and deforestation 
                                                 
15
 Principal component analysis allows neutralising a potential multicollinearity problem as well. The latter can 
however hardly be rigorously tested because of missing instruments. 
16
 The sign of the insecurity measure should not be given a particular interpretation. Measures should solely be 
taken relatively, for instance: property right insecurity is higher in Rondonia (-.56) than in Acre (-.77); and 
Rondonia insecurity is smaller than in Mato Grosso (0.08). In short, an increase in the measure depicts an 
increase in insecurity. 
17
 The state of Para is often quoted as an example of struggle for land (Luta pela terra).  
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3.1.3 Controls 
Several control variables (Xk) are introduced in the estimations in order to replicate usual 
drivers of deforestation considered in the literature. An environmental Kuznets curve for 
deforestation is specified to catch a non linear influence of income per capita (GDPC and 
GDPC2) on deforestation (e.g. Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2000; Barbier, 2004; Bhattarai and 
Hammig, 2004; Culas, 2007; Koop and Tole, 2001). One would expect an increase in 
deforestation due to agricultural expansion and demand for fuelwood in first stages of 
development (e.g. Anderson, 1990 for Brazil). The relation may be reversed in later stages. 
First, diversification of the economy increases the share of non agricultural activities. Second, 
there is an energy ladder that exhibits energy substitutions from biomass to fossil or 
hydroelectric energy accordingly with the level of development. Third, environment tends to 
be a luxury good and thus development induces a demand for natural forest preservation.  
Other control variables are related to development policies and to the profitability of 
alternative activities in the Brazilian Amazon. Road network (Roads)18 is introduced as proxy 
of transportation costs which are usually considered as a major factor of deforestation in the 
region (Pfaff, 1999; Weinhold and Reis, 2007). Cattle prices (Cattle prices) capture 
profitability of cattle ranching which is often blamed to be the main cause of deforestation in 
the Brazilian Amazon (Walker et al., 2000). Forest area (Forest area) and population density 
(Density) are also usual control variables. Forest area captures the saturation effect or forest 
scarcity effect associated with deforestation: deforestation decreases as forest areas become 
scarcer.19 Population density may have a positive effect on deforestation by increasing food 
                                                 
18
 Road network is measured by kilometers of federal and state paved roads reported by the Ministry of 
infrastructures and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). Unpaved roads data appeared to 
be too unreliable to be considered (Andersen et al., 2002, chapter 3). Since data do not exist for 1994, 1996, and 
1998; the missing values are interpolated. 
19
 The IBGE gives an evaluation of forest areas for 1991 of which accuracy may be questioned. Yearly forest 
coverage on the 1988-2000 period were reconstituted for the econometric analysis. The Forest area variable 
should only be considered as a rough approximation of forest areas.  
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demand, but this effect may be partially compensated by an increase in the demand for forest 
products and forest surfaces (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003). Increased population density 
may also promote the adoption of more intensive agricultural techniques (Pfaff, 1999).  
3.1.4 Endogeneity bias 
An endogeneity bias is suspected as deforestation may reduce ownership insecurity: 
landowners are prompted to clear preventively in order to discourage squatters from invading 
their lands and to prevent expropriation processes. The variable measuring property rights 
insecurity must therefore be instrumented. The restriction implied by instrumental variables is 
that, conditional on the control variables, they do not have any effect on deforestation, other 
than their effects through insecure property rights. State expenditure for judiciary functions 
(Justice) is used as an instrument.20 Supposedly, this variable captures the ability of the 
judiciary system to secure property rights and thus to prevent land conflicts. However, 
judiciary spending could be the mechanical consequence of insecure property rights: to 
repress land conflicts, judiciary spending ought to increase with property insecurity. It is 
assumed however that this is unlikely to be the case. Land procedures represent only a tiny 
part of judiciary procedures that are mainly concerned with criminal and civil procedures in 
urban areas. Moreover instrumental equations exhibit negative and highly significant 
marginal impacts of judiciary spending on property rights insecurity (Table 4). Thus, judiciary 
spending seems to prevent land insecurity rather than to be the mechanical result of legal 
procedures generated by land conflicts.  
[Insert Table 4] Instrumental equations 
                                                 
20
 State judiciary spending comes from the IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Applicada) database and is 
deflated by consumer price indices calculated by the Fondaçao Getulio Vargas. 
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3.2 Econometric Results 
[Insert Table 5] Econometric results 
The deforestation equation is estimated using the panel two-stage least squares (TSLS) 
estimator with time and state fixed effects (Table 5). The instrumental variables are the 
contemporaneous (Justice, equations 1, 2, 3, 4) and lagged (Justice(-1), equation 4) judiciary 
spending. The latter attempts to take into account delayed preventive effects. As the model is 
over identified, it is possible to test the accuracy of instruments, i.e. their orthogonal character 
with respect to the residuals from TSLS estimation (equation 4). The relevance of 
instrumental variables in first stage equations (Table 4), i.e. the null hypothesis of weak 
instruments, is tested in two ways. Firstly, coefficients’ significance of instrumental variables 
is tested with F tests of which p values are reported in Table 5. Secondly, the adjusted R² 
statistic from instrumental (first stage) equations is reported in Table 4. The results show that 
instruments are not weak; the TSLS inference is thus reliable. In addition, the Nakamura and 
Nakamura (1981) exogeneity and Sargan (1988) overidentification tests are presented. The 
Nakamura and Nakamura test rejects the exogeneity of property rights insecurity (null 
hypothesis) at the 1% level whereas the Sargan test cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
instrumental variables orthogonality (with respect to the residual) at the 1% level.  
The existence of a deforestation Kuznets curve is weakly confirmed (equations 1, 2, 3).21 
Suggested explanations for the weak significance of GDPC coefficients are: first, the variance 
of development levels of Brazilian Amazonian states is insufficient to capture the Kuznets 
curve; second, part of the impact of GDPC and GDPC² is caught by state and period fixed 
effects. Third, Brazil is an important ethanol sugarcane producer. At advanced stages of 
development, an increase in GDPC can lead to an expansion of ethanol demand which can 
promote deforestation and thus may displace the turning point of the curve. Cattle prices are 
                                                 
21
 The GDP coefficients should be cautiously interpreted; they may be affected by an endogeneity bias.  
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not significant (equation 1). This result may be the consequence of integrated cattle markets: 
cattle prices follow a common trend that is caught by time fixed effects. Nevertheless, we can 
assume that cattle ranching is driven by other factors than cattle prices such as securing 
property right. Forest area is also insignificant while Roads and Density (in logarithms) have 
a positive and significant effect on deforestation (equations 1 and 2).22 Since the Roads 
variable is weakly reliable (due to missing data, see footnote 18) estimation results are given 
with (equations 1 and 2) and without (equations 3 and 4) this variable: the effect of Insecurity 
on deforestation remains unchanged. 
Whatever the specification, insecure property rights have a positive impact on 
deforestation.23 This impact is significant at the 1% level when Justice is the sole instrument 
(equations 1, 2, and 3); it is significant at the 5% level when both Justice and Justice(-1) are 
used as instruments (equation 4). The instrumentation procedure allows interpreting the effect 
of insecure property rights as a causal relationship. Consequently, policy measures aiming at 
reducing property rights insecurity should allow reducing deforestation rates in the Brazilian 
Amazon. A simulation exercise is provided to estimate an elasticity of deforestation with 
respect to insecurity taking its lowest estimated coefficient (equation 3) in order not to 
overestimate the effect of insecurity on deforestation. The elasticity evaluated at median 
values of insecurity and deforestation shows that a 10% decrease in insecurity induces a 7% 
decrease in annual deforestation rates.24  
                                                 
22
 Roads are considered as an exogenous variable since the location of federal and state roads is independent 
from forest clearing (Andersen et al. 2002). When Roads and Density are introduced separately, these two 
variables are not significant. 
23
 OLS estimates (not presented in the paper but available from the authors) underestimate the impact of insecure 
property rights on deforestation when compared to TSLS estimates. Unobserved determinants of deforestation 
are thus negatively correlated with insecure property rights. This result strengthens the assumption according to 
which deforestation is a mean of securing land property rights. 
24
 The functional form does not allow directly inferring elasticities; a log-log specification is not relevant. 
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4 Concluding remarks 
The main outcome of this paper is that insecure property rights in land drive deforestation 
in the Brazilian Amazon. This result should not be interpreted as a simple positive correlation 
between deforestation and property rights insecurity. A causal relationship is provided by a 
theoretical analysis and econometric estimations on the Brazilian Amazonian states in the 
1988-2000 period, that rely on instrumental variables. Thus an exogenous escalation in 
property rights insecurity brings a significant increase in the rate of deforestation.  
Two main aspects of property rights insecurity have been considered: occurrence of violent 
conflicts for land access and scale of expropriation procedures for land reform purposes. It is 
argued that the way land reform is implemented has a detrimental impact on deforestation: 
untenured deforesters claim property rights that are gained after expropriation procedures. 
Indeed, according to the Brazilian rule of law, forested lands, even privately owned, are often 
classified as unproductive and hence eligible to expropriation. 
This paper does not intend to assess the relevance of the Brazilian land reform. Land 
reform is a potential source of equity benefits, production and productivity gains, investment 
incentives, better access to credit for the poor. Moreover, tenure security favours sustainable 
uses of natural resources (e.g. Cattaneo, 2001) and allows payments for natural services 
provision (e.g. Fearnside, 2003; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005). However, it may be desirable to 
accommodate land reform purposes and environmental concerns. 
It is suggested here that modifying the incentive framework could help reducing 
deforestation. Sustainable forest management should be regarded as a productive use of land 
in the Brazilian law. Beyond the scope of this paper is the definition of operational measures 
of sustainable tropical forest management, which should in fact resolve the conflicts related to 
the secure property rights between the landowners and the squatters in the Brazilian Legal 
Amazon. 
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Appendix 
 [Insert Table 6] Descriptive statistics 
[Insert Table 7] Property rights insecurity measure: principal component analysis on 
pooled sample 
5 References 
Alchian, A. A., 1965. Some Economics of Property Rights. II Politico, 30, 819-829. 
Alchian, A.A. and Demsetz, H. 1973. The Property Right Paradigm. The Journal of Economic 
History, 33 (1), The Tasks of Economic History, 16-27. 
Alston, L.J., Libecap, G.D. and Mueller, B., 2000. Land reform policies, the sources of 
violent conflict and the implications for deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 39 (2), 162-188. 
Alston L.J., Libecap, G.D. and Schneider, R., 1996. The Determinants and Impact of Property 
Rights: Land Title on the Brazilian Frontier. Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, 12 (1), 25-61. 
Andersen, L.E., Granger, C.W.J., Reis, E.J., Weinhold, D. and Wunder, S., 2002. The 
Dynamics of Deforestation and Economic Growth in the Brazilian Amazon. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Anderson, A., 1990. Smokestacks in the Rainforest: Industrial Development and 
Deforestation in the Amazon Basin. World Development, 18 (9), 1191-1205. 
Angelsen, A. and Kaimowitz, D., 2000. Rethinking the Causes of Deforestation: Lessons 
from Economic Models. World Bank Research Observer, 14 (1), 73-98. 
Angelsen, A., 2001. Playing Games in the Forest: State-Local Conflicts of Land 
Appropriation. Land Economics, 77 (2), Tropical Deforestation and Land Use, 285-299. 
Angelsen, A., 2007. Forest Cover Change in Space and Time: Combining the Von Thunen 
and Forest Transition Theories. SSRN eLibrary. 
Araujo, Cl., Araujo Bonjean, C., Combes, J.L. and Combes Motel, P., 2006. Relação entre 
mercado de terras, crescimento econômico e insegurança fundiaria explicada por um 
modelo a geração imbricada. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, (26) 4, 575-595. 
Arcand, JL., Guillaumont, P., and Guillaumont Jeanneney, S., 2007. Deforestation and the 
Real Exchange Rate. Journal of Development Economics, forthcoming. 
Barbier, EB., 2004. Explaining Agricultural Land Expansion and Deforestation in Developing 
Countries. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86 (5), 1347-53. 
Bhattarai, M. and Hammig, M., 2001. Institutions and the Environmental Kuznets Curve for 
Deforestation: A Cross-Country Analysis for Latin America, Africa, and Asia. World 
Development, 29 (6), 995-1010. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.20 
 
 
22 
Bhattarai, M. and Hammig, M., 2004. Governance, economic policy, and the environmental 
Kuznets curve for natural tropical forests. Environment and Development Economics, 9 
(3), 367-382. 
Binswanger, HP., 1991. Brazilian Policies that Encourage Deforestation in the Amazon. 
World Development, 19 (7), 821-829. 
Bohn, H. and Deacon, R.T., 2000. Ownership Risk, Investment, and the Use of Natural 
Resources. The American Economic Review, 90 (3), 526-549. 
Cattaneo A., 2000. Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Comparing the Impacts of 
Macroeconomic, Shocks, Land Tenure, and Technological Change. Land Economics, 77 
(2), Tropical Deforestation and Land Use. 219-240. 
Caviglia-Harris, J.L., 2005. Cattle Accumulation and Land Use Intensification by Household 
in the Brazilian Amazon. Investigating Household Participation in the Cattle Industry. 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 34(2), 145-162. 
Chomitz, K.M. and Thomas, T.S., 2003. Determinants of Land Use in Amazonia: A Fine-
Scale Spatial Analysis. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85, 1016-1028.  
Cleary, D., 1993. After the Frontier: Problems with Political Economy in the Modern 
Brazilian Amazon. Journal of Latin American Studies, 25 (2), 331-349. 
Cropper, M. and Griffiths, C., 1994. The Interaction of Population Growth and Environmental 
Quality. American Economic Review, 84 (2), Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and 
Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 250-54. 
Culas, R.J., 2007. Deforestation and the Environmental Kuznets Curve: An Institutional 
Perspective. Ecological Economics, 61 (2/3), 429-437. 
De Soto, H., 2000. The Mystery of Capital. Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else. Basic Books. 
Deacon, R.T., 1994. Deforestation and the Rule of Law in a Cross-Section of Countries. Land 
Economics, 70 (4), 414-30. 
Deacon, R.T., 1999. Deforestation and Ownership: Evidence from Historical Accounts and 
Contemporary Data. Land Economics, 75 (3), 341-359. 
Deininger, K. and Minten, B., 2002. Determinants of Deforestation and the Economics of 
Protection: An Application to Mexico. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 84 
(4), 943-960.  
Fearnside, PM., 2001. Land-tenure issues as factors in environmental destruction in Brazilian 
Amazonia: The case of Southern Para. World Development, 29 (8), 1361-1372. 
Fearnside, PM., 2003. Conservation Policy in Brazilian Amazonia: Understanding the 
Dilemmas. World Development, 31 (5), 757-779. 
Foster, A. and Rosenzweig, M., 2003. Economic Growth and the Rise of Forests. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118 (2), 601-638. 
Furubotn, E. and S. Pejovich, 1974. The Economics of Property Rights. Ballinger. 
Geist, H.J. and Lambin, E.F., 2002. Proximate Causes and Underlying Driving Forces of 
Tropical Deforestation. BioScience, 52(2), 143-150. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.20 
 
 
23 
Godoy, R., Jacobson, M., de Castro, J., Aliaga, V., Romero J. And Davis, A., 1998. The Role 
of Tenure Security and Private Time Preference in Neotropical Deforestation. Land 
Economics, 74 (2), 162-170. 
Grieg-Gran, M., Porras, I. and Wunder, S., 2005. How can market mechanisms for forest 
environmental services help the poor? Preliminary lessons from Latin America. World 
Development, 33 (9), 1511-1527. 
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), 2005, Revised ITTO criteria and 
indicators for the sustainable management of tropical forests including reporting format, 
ITTO Policy Development Series #15.  
Kaimowitz, D., 1996. Livestock and Deforestation. Central America in the 1980s and 1990s: 
A Policy Perspective. CIFOR, Special Publication. 
Knack, S. and Keefer, P., 1995. Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-country Tests 
Using Alternative Institutional Measures. Economics and Politics, 7 (3), 207-228.  
Koop, G. and Tole, L., 2001. Deforestation, Distribution and Development. Global 
Environmental Change, 11 (3), 193-202. 
Libecap, G., 1999. Contracting for property rights. Mimeo University of Arizona and NBER. 
Margulis, S., 2003. Causes of Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon. World Bank Working 
Paper, n°22, The World Bank. 
Mendelsohn, R., 1994. Property rights and deforestation. Oxford Economic Papers, New 
series, 46, 750-756. 
Mertens, B., Poccard Chapuis, R., Piketty, M.G., Laques, A.E. and Venturieri, A., 2002. 
Crossing Spatial Analyses and Livestock Economics to understand Deforestation 
Processes in the Brazilian Amazon: The Case of Sao Felix do Xingu in South Para. 
Agricultural Economics, 27(3), 269-294. 
Nakamura, A. and Nakamura, M. 1981. On the Relationships Among Several Specification 
Error Tests Presented by Durbin, Wu and Hausman. Econometrica, 49 (6), 1583-1588 
Nelson, G.C., Harris,V. and Stone, S.W., 2001. Deforestation, Land use, and Property Rights: 
Empirical Evidence from Darién, Panama. Land Economics, 77 (2),  187-205. 
Otsuki, T., Hardie, I., and Reis, E.J., 2002. The Implication of Property Rights for Joint 
Agriculture Timber Productivity in the Brazilian Amazon. Environment and Development 
Economics, 7 (2), 299-324. 
Pfaff, A.S.P., 1999. What Drives Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon? Evidence from 
Satellite and Socioeconomic Data. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
37, 26-43. 
Sargan, J.D., 1988. Testing for Misspecification after Estimating Using Instrumental 
Variables. In E. Maasoumi (ed) Contributions to Econometrics: John Denis Sargan, 1, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Solow, R., 1992. An Almost Practical Step Toward Sustainability. Paper presented at the 
Resource and conservation Center in Washington D.C. on October 8. 
Southgate, D., Sanders, J., and Ehui, S., 1990. Resource Degradation in Africa and Latin 
America: Population Pressure, Policies and Property Arrangements. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 72 (5), Proceedings Issue, pp. 1259-1263. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.20 
 
 
24 
Van Kooten, G.C. and Folmer, H., 2004. Land and Forest Economics. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. 
Walker R., Moran, E. and Anselin, L., 2000. Deforestation and cattle ranching in the Brazilian 
Amazon: external capital and household processes. World Development, 28 (4), 683-699. 
Weinhold, D. and Reis, E.J., 2007. Transportation costs and the spatial distribution of land 
use in the Brazilian Amazon. Global Environment Change. Forthcoming.  
Wood, C.H. and Walker, R., 2001. Land titles, tenure security and resource use among small 
farmers in the Brazilian Amazon. Paper in S67: Population and the Environment, Local. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.20 
 
 
25 
Table 1. Correlation matrix of insecurity indicators 
 Homicides Expropriation 
number 
Expropriated 
areas 
Homicides 1.00   
Expropriation number 0.18 ** 1.00  
Expropriated areas 0.38 *** 0.68 *** 1.00 
Source : Authors’ calculations. Number of observations : 113, Period : 1988-2000. * : 
significant at 10% level ; ** : significant at 5% level ; *** : significant at 1% level 
 
Table 2. State level of property rights insecurity and deforestation 
 Median values of 
 Insecurity Deforestation 
States (Number of 
obs) 
 (annual, km²) (annual, percentage of 
state area) 
Rondônia (13) -0.56 2340 0.98 
Acre (13) -0.77 482 0.31 
Amazonas (10) -0.91 33 < 0.01 
Roraima (13) -1.06 240 0.11 
Pará (13) 1.75 5111 0.41 
Amapá (13) -0.95 720 0.50 
Tocantins (12) -0.49 371 0.13 
Maranhão (13) 0.20 1065 0.32 
Mato Grosso (13) 0.08 6220 0.69 
Pooled sample 
(113) 
-0.43 730 0.34 
Source: Authors’ calculations (Insecurity) and INPE (Deforestation). 
 
Table 3. Annual level of property rights insecurity and deforestation 
 Median values of 
Years (Number of obs) Insecurity Deforestation 
  (annual, km²) 
1988 (8) -0.33 1925 
1989 (9) -0.42 1180 
1990 (9) -0.94 580 
1991 (9) -0.86 670 
1992 (9) -0.23 799 
1993 (9) -0.97 372 
1994 (9) -0.82 372 
1995 (9) -0.16 1745 
1996 (8) -0.10 1042 
1997 (9) -0.02 409 
1998(9) -0.12 670 
1999 (8) -0.37 975 
2000 (8) -0.12 838 
Pooled sample (113) -0.43 730 
Source: Authors’ calculations (Insecurity) and INPE (Deforestation). The potential number of 
observations is 117 which is reduced to 113 because of missing values.  
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Table 4. Intrumental equations 
 Explained variable: Insecurity 
Justice -4.64 e-05 
(-2.26)** 
-6.07 e-05  
(-2.06)** 
-5.45 e-05  
(-2.66)*** 
Justice(-1)   -3.32 e-05 
(-1.72)*  
GDPC -1.18 
(-2.15)** 
-0.72  
(-1.46) 
-0.65  
(-1.03) 
GDPC2 0.10 
(2.32)** 
0.07  
(1.81) * 
0.05  
(0.90) 
Roads -0.23 
(-2.34)** 
  
Density -6.26 
(-3.09)*** 
  
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.61 0.60 
Obs 113 113 105 
Estimation method: panel least squares. White period standard errors and covariance. t 
statistics are in parentheses. *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: 
significant at 1% level 
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Table 5. Econometric results 
 Explained variable: Deforestation 
Equations 1 2 3 4 
Insecurity 1840.58 1756.68 1270.95 1335.49 
 (2.67)*** (2.70)*** (2.43) *** (1.95)** 
GDPC 2884.76 2478.13 1133.00 974.53 
 (1.87)* (1.73)* (1.52) * (1.14) 
GDPC2 -232.15 -194.92 -104.89 -69.68 
 (-1.78)* (-1.76)* (-1.70) * (-0.86) 
Roads 563.08 428.54   
 (1.94)* (1.98)**   
Density 16174.56 12608.03   
 (1.91)* (1.81)*   
Forest area 2.77 e-03    
 (0.31)    
Cattle prices 8140.66    
 (0.67)    
     
Obs 111 113 113 105 
Adjusted R² 0.53 0.57 0.71 0.69 
Cross-section/period F (P-
value) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Instrument list Justice Justice Justice Justice, 
Justice(-1) 
First stage (significance of 
instruments): p value 
0.31 0.03 0.004 0.03 
Exogeneity test: p-value 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Suridentification test: p 
value 
   0.57 
Estimation method: panel two-stage least squares. White period standard errors and 
covariance correction. *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant 
at 1% level. Unless otherwise specified, t statistics are in parentheses. The equations 1 to 4 
differ by the control variables and by the instrumental variables. 
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Table 6. Pooled sample: Descriptive statistics (1988 2000) 
Variables   Mean  Median Std. Dev. Source : 
Deforestation State annual deforestation, km2 1936.49 730.00 2280.61 www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/index.html 
Homicides Number of homicides related to 
land conflicts 
2.97 1.00 5.25 www.mst.org.br 
www.cpt.org.br 
Expropriated areas Surfaces expropriated, km2 1394.08 54000.0 2074.75 http://www.incra.gov.br/ 
Expropriation 
number 
Number of expropriations 
procedures 
10.32 2.00 18.57 http://www.incra.gov.br/ 
GDPC  Gross domestic product per 
capita, 103 real Reais per capita 
3.51 3.31 1.35 http://www.ipeadata.gov.br 
Justice Judiciary expenses, 103 real 
Reais 
3315.69 1114.97 5272.15 http://www.ipeadata.gov.br 
Roads Paved roads, km 1261.47 855.00 1224.65 Ministry of Infrastructures, 
Transportation department and 
http://www.ibge.gov.br 
Density Population density, habitants per 
km2 
4.36 3.17 4.22 http://www.ibge.gov.br 
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Table 7. Property rights insecurity measure: principal component analysis on pooled sample 
 Principal Component 1 Principal Component 2 Principal Component 3 
Eigenvalues 1.86 0.85 0.29 
Variance 
Proportion 0.62 0.28 0.10 
Eigenvectors : 
Variable Weights 1 Weights 2 Weights 3 
    
Homicides -0.42 -0.88 -0.22 
Expropriated 
areas -0.62 0.45 -0.64 
Expropriation 
number -0.67 0.14 0.73 
The columns of the first part of the table refer to the principal components. The eigenvalues 
and the explained variance proportions are displayed. The variance proportion is calculated as 
the ratio of each eigenvalue to the sum of all eigenvalues. The columns of the second part of 
the table display the weights corresponding to each principal component (eigenvector 
corresponding to each principal component). In order to ease the interpretation, the opposite 
of the principal component 1 is introduced in the regressions. 
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Figure 1. Annual deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon 
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Source: INPE (National Institute for Space Research), Project PRODES (Program for Deforestation Assessment in the Brazilian Legal 
Amazonia). (a) Average value between 1977 and 1988; (b) Average value between 1993 and 1994; (c) Consolidated deforestation rates. States 
values on the left axis; Total Brazilian Legal Amazon on the right axis. 
